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IS THERE A SILVER LINING?
DARK MONEY AND SUPPORT FOR
STATE COURTS*
Michael J. Nelson**
INTRODUCTION
Judges and scholars alike underscore the importance of public sup-
port for the efficacy of the judicial branch.1  Courts famously lack both
the power of the purse and the sword, meaning they are unable to
fund themselves nor use the necessary force to implement their deci-
sions.  As a result, courts depend on other actors to implement their
decisions, and implementation is hastened by the legitimacy of the ju-
dicial branch.  A legislative or executive branch that refuses to comply
with the decision of a legitimate court will be punished in the next
election by voters who perceive the judicial branch as legitimate.
Our understanding of public support for courts is complicated at the
state court level by the widespread use of popular elections to select
and retain judges.  While elections are generally legitimacy-enhancing
institutions, the trappings of judicial campaigns are fraught with peril.2
Perhaps the most potent threat to the public’s willingness to support
their state supreme court comes from campaign contributions, a fea-
* I thank Jim Gibson, Keith Schnakenberg, Zachary Baumann, and Morgan Hazelton for
helpful conversations and Steven Saroka for helpful research assistance.
** Jeffrey L. Hyde and Sharon D. Hyde and Political Science Board of Visitors Early Career
Professor in Political Science, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Affiliate Law
Faculty, Pennsylvania State University. mjn15@psu.edu.
1. Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme
Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635, 635 (1992); Jeffery J. Mondak & Shannon Ishiyama Smithey, The
Dynamics of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 59 J. POL. 1114, 1138–40 (1997). While the
focus in this article is on the legitimacy of the judiciaries of the United States, legitimacy is no
less important outside the boundaries of the United States. See, e.g., James L. Gibson et al., On
the Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 343, 349 (1998); Amanda Driscoll
& Michael J. Nelson, Judicial Selection and the Democratization of Justice: Lessons from the
Bolivian Judicial Elections 3 J. LAW & COURTS 115, 116, 134–35 (2015).  Likewise, institutions of
all stripes depend on public support for their efficacy. See, e.g., JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH
THEISS-MORSE, CONGRESS AS PUBLIC ENEMY 22 (1995).
2. JAMES L. GIBSON, ELECTING JUDGES: THE SURPRISING EFFECTS OF CAMPAIGNING ON JU-
DICIAL LEGITIMACY 136 (2012).
187
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ture of campaigns that robust evidence from political science has
demonstrated can harm perceptions of judicial legitimacy.3
Concerns about the campaign finance and judicial legitimacy nexus
are only likely to magnify as spending in judicial races continues to
grow at a high rate.4  Indeed, given that campaign spending more than
doubled in judicial races between 1990–1999 and 2000–2009, there is
reason for concern regarding the long-term ramifications of high
levels of campaign spending on public support for state supreme
courts.5
Compounding these normative concerns is the growth of dark
money support—campaign support which cannot be traced back to
specific donors—in these elections.  Unlike traditional campaign sup-
port, in which donors provide contributions directly to candidates who
are typically required to disclose the source of their funds, dark
money support obscures the connection between donor and recipient,
leaving litigants unsure if their opponents contributed to a judge’s po-
sition on the bench and leaving them with no means to verify any
suspected conflicts of interest.
While the political science research on campaign contributions and
judicial legitimacy raises concerns about the relationship between
campaign financing and support for courts,6 an inquiry into the rela-
tionship between these two concepts is also important in light of doc-
trinal concerns.  The Supreme Court of the United States has
recognized that campaign finance reforms can be justified by the
state’s interest in preventing “both the actual corruption threatened
by large financial contributions and . . . the appearance of corruption”
that could result from such support.7
This Article examines the consequences of campaign support on the
public’s belief that their state supreme court is fair, impartial, and le-
gitimate.  Relying on a survey of 800 Americans, I demonstrate that
the public penalizes courts and judges who receive support from dark
money groups less than they penalize those that receive support—ei-
ther direct or independent—from known litigants directly.  Moreover,
these effects do not dissipate with the passage of time.  These results
3. James L. Gibson, Challenges to the Impartiality of State Supreme Courts: Legitimacy Theory
and “New-Style” Judicial Campaigns, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 59, 62 (2008).
4. JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2000-2009: DECADE OF
CHANGE 68 (2010), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/JAS-NPJE-Decade-
ONLINE.pdf.
5. Id. at 1–2.
6. See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 3, at 62.
7. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 135 (2003).
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have important implications for both the legitimacy of state supreme
courts and the likelihood of reform.
II. COURTS AND THEIR PUBLICS
A. The Importance of Public Support for Courts
The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged the importance of its
legitimacy and the relationship of that legitimacy to compliance.  In
perhaps the most famous statement regarding the importance of legiti-
macy to the Court made in recent years, Justice O’Connor wrote in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey that:
As Americans of each succeeding generation are rightly told, the
Court cannot buy support for its decisions by spending money and,
except to a minor degree, it cannot independently coerce obedience
to its decrees.  The Court’s power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a
product of substance and perception that shows itself in the people’s
acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation’s law
means and to declare what it demands . . . .
The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow
people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for
them, as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social
and political pressures having, as such, no bearing on the principled
choices that the Court is obliged to make.  Thus, the Court’s legiti-
macy depends on making legally principled decisions under circum-
stances in which their principled character is sufficiently plausible to
be accepted by the Nation.8
The frequency with which the Court publicly acknowledges its legiti-
macy has increased over time.  The Court has made seventy-one direct
references to its legitimacy since deciding Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion in 1954, but only made nine similar references before that point in
time.9  More recently, dissenting in Bush v. Gore, Justice Breyer de-
scribed “the public’s confidence in the Court” as “a public treasure”
that has been “built slowly over many years.”10  But what, exactly, is
legitimacy?  Tyler provides a clear explication:
Legitimacy is a psychological property of an authority, institution,
or social arrangement that leads those connected to it to believe
that it is appropriate, proper, and just.  Because of legitimacy, peo-
ple feel that they ought to defer to decisions and rules, following
8. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992).
9. Dion Farganis, Do Reasons Matter? The Impact of Opinion Content on Supreme Court
Legitimacy, 65 POLIT. RES. Q. 206, 207 (2012).
10. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 157 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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them voluntarily out of obligation rather than out of fear of punish-
ment or anticipation of reward.11
Scholars use synonyms like “authority” and “diffuse support” as ana-
logues for legitimacy.12
In one of the most famous statements of the concept, David Easton
compared legitimacy to “a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will
that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are
opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging to their wants.”13
The notion of legitimacy as a reservoir is particularly apt: a single disa-
greeable decision should not drain an otherwise robust reservoir of
support, though a reservoir might become drained after repeated chal-
lenges, such as a series of disagreeable decisions.
Diffuse support differs from other types of support for courts.14
Most notably, institutions also have specific support.  In Easton’s ter-
minology, specific support “can be closely associated with the satisfac-
tions obtained from specific classes of output” such as the policies
promulgated by an institution.15  Easton notes that diffuse and specific
support should not be too closely related; legitimate institutions can
make unpopular decisions without losing their legitimacy.  Indeed, in
Gibson’s apt phrase, “legitimacy is for losers”: it only matters for insti-
tutions once an objection precondition is met.16  When individuals
agree with an institution’s decision, they comply even in the absence
of legitimacy.  When satisfaction is tested, legitimacy encourages com-
pliance even in the face of dissatisfaction.17  However, in the face of a
11. Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANNU. REV.
PSYCHOL. 375, 375 (2006).  For other reviews of the academic literature on legitimacy, see James
L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court: Conventional Wis-
doms and Recent Challenges Thereto, ANNU. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 201, 202 (2014); JOSH T. JOST
& BRENDA MAJOR, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEGITIMACY: EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON IDEOL-
OGY, JUSTICE, AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS 3 (2001).
12. DAVID EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE 268 (1965).
13. Id. at 273.
14. Diffuse and specific support are also different from confidence in an institution. Confi-
dence reflects a blend of diffuse and specific support: more unyielding than strict performance
satisfaction but more malleable than diffuse support. See, e.g., James L. Gibson et al., Measuring
Attitudes Toward the United States Supreme Court, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 354, 355 (2003); Gregory
A. Caldeira, Neither the Purse Nor the Sword: Dynamics of Public Confidence in the Supreme
Court, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1209, 1212–13 (1986).
15. EASTON, supra note 13, at 268; David Easton, A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political
Support, 5 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 435, 439 (1975).
16. James L. Gibson, Legitimacy Is for Losers: The Interconnections of Institutional Legiti-
macy, Performance Evaluations, and the Symbols of Judicial Authority, MOTIVATING COOPERA-
TION AND COMPLIANCE WITH AUTHORITY: THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL TRUST 81–116 (Brian
H. Bornstein & Alan J. Tomkins eds., vol. 62, 2015).
17. James L. Gibson et al., Why Do People Accept Public Policies They Oppose? Testing Le-
gitimacy Theory with a Survey-Based Experiment, 58 POL. RES. Q. 187, 188 (2005).
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sustained string of dissatisfying decisions, support for an institution
will decline.18  The mechanism is a complicated psychological one,
theorized to rely on implicit information processing and the omnipres-
ence of judicial symbols.19  The presence of such symbols can sever
the relationship between disappointment and a decline in support for
a court.20
The extent to which performance satisfaction harms the institu-
tional legitimacy of courts is debated by scholars.21  Studies generally
show that performance satisfaction has some effect on judicial legiti-
macy, though that effect is not as important as other factors, such as
democratic values or perceived politicization.22  As a result, support
for the U.S. Supreme Court is markedly stable over time.23  Other
studies that examine support for the Court before and after a high-
profile decision, such as the Court’s decisions in Bush v. Gore, or Na-
tional Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, generally find
aggregate stability in the Court’s legitimacy.24 In short, legitimacy
18. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Blacks and the United States Supreme Court:
Models of Diffuse Support, 54 J. POL. 1120, 1130 (1992).
19. James L. Gibson et al., Losing, But Accepting: Legitimacy, Positivity Theory, and the Sym-
bols of Judicial Authority, 48 LAW & SOC. REV. 837, 839 (2014); James L. Gibson & Michael J.
Nelson, Change in Institutional Support for the U.S. Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Effects of
Disappointment in the Court’s Rulings, 80 PUB. OP. Q. 622, 638 (2016).
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Brandon L. Bartels & Christopher D. Johnston, On the Ideological Foundations
of Supreme Court Legitimacy in the American Public, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 184, 185 (2013); James
L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, Is the U.S. Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Grounded in Perform-
ance Satisfaction and Ideology?, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 162, 162–63 (2015).
22. James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, Reconsidering Positivity Theory: What Roles do
Politicization, Ideological Disagreement, and Legal Realism Play in Shaping U.S. Supreme Court
Legitimacy? 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 592 (2017).
23. James L. Gibson, The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court in a Polarized Polity, 4 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 507, 516 (2007).
24. Dino P. Christenson & David M. Glick, Chief Justice Roberts’s Health Care Decision Dis-
robed: The Microfoundations of the Supreme Court’s Legitimacy, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 403, 404
(2015); James L. Gibson et al., The Supreme Court and the US Presidential Election of 2000:
Wounds, Self-inflicted or Otherwise?, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 535, 545 (2003); Herbert M. Kritzer,
The Impact of Bush v. Gore on Public Perceptions and Knowledge of the Supreme Court, 85
JUDICATURE 32, 33, 37 (2001).  Other studies have found that public attitudes toward the
Court—though not necessarily legitimacy—are affected by single judicial decisions.  Anke
Grosskopf & Jeffery J. Mondak, Do Attitudes Toward Specific Supreme Court Decisions Matter?:
The Impact of Webster and Texas v. Johnson on Public Confidence in the Supreme Court, 51 POL.
RES. Q. 633, 651 (1998).  Studies that examine those most affected by decisions do find some
effect of change in support for the institution. See, e.g., Valerie J. Hoekstra, The Supreme Court
and Local Public Opinion, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 89, 97 (2000).  To compound the issue, the
Court might act strategically, deciding cases in line with public opinion in order to maintain its
legitimacy.  Marshall notes that only 33 percent of the Court’s decisions between 1935 and 1986
were inconsistent with public opinion. THOMAS MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SU-
PREME COURT 78 (1989).
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serves a vital function for all political institutions and is especially im-
portant for courts.  As a result, maintaining public support is particu-
larly important for these institutions to be able to fulfill their role as
equal partners in governance.
B. Judicial Campaigns and Support for Courts
The dynamics of judicial legitimacy are different at the state level
where most judges must receive the support of a plurality of voters to
be elected.  Because elections are legitimacy-enhancing, judicial elec-
tions theoretically provide these courts with a direct mechanism
through which they can renew and enhance their legitimacy.25
With only a handful of exceptions, the United States is unique in its
use of popular judicial elections to select and retain judges.26  Origi-
nally adopted as a means to curb state legislatures who were leading
states into fiscal peril,27 judicial elections today are competitive, fea-
turing many trappings of modern-day legislative and executive
campaigns.28
What are the consequences of judicial elections on public support
for courts?  There is no clear-cut answer to this question.  Some evi-
dence, like the experimental evidence provided by Nownes and Glen-
non, suggest that the use of judicial appointment is associated with
lower levels of judicial legitimacy,29 while Nelson’s observational evi-
dence suggests a positive relationship between the use of judicial elec-
25. Gibson, supra note 3, at 59.
26. The two most notable exceptions are Bolivia and Japan.  Bolivians adopted national non-
partisan elections to select their national judges, electing the first judges in 2011.  Japan uses
uncontestable retention elections to retain some of its judges.  Amanda Driscoll & Michael J.
Nelson, The 2011 Judicial Elections in Bolivia, 31 ELEC. STUD. 628, 628–29 (2012); Amanda
Driscoll & Michael J. Nelson, The Political Origins of Judicial Elections: Evidence from the
United States and Bolivia, 96 JUDICATURE 151, 151–52 (2013); David S. Law, The Anatomy of a
Conservative Court: Judicial Review in Japan, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1545, 1589 (2009).
27. Jed H. Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial Review,
123 HARV. L. REV. 1061, 1066 (2010); JED H. SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS 57 (2012); F.
Andrew Hanssen, Learning about Judicial Independence: Institutional Change in the State Courts,
33 J. LEGAL STUD. 431, 432, 441 (2004); Kermit L. Hall, Progressive Reform and the Decline of
Democratic Accountability: The Popular Election of State Supreme Court Judges, 1850–1920,
1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 345, 347 (1984). Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly Expla-
nations for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190,
204 (1993).
28. CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2
(2009); MELINDA GANN HALL, ATTACKING JUDGES 1 (2014); HERBERT M. KRITZER, JUSTICES
ON THE BALLOT 238 (2015).
29. Anthony J. Nownes & Colin Glennon, An Experimental Investigation of How Judicial
Elections Affect Public Faith in the Judicial System, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 37, 38 (2015).
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tions and judicial legitimacy.30  Nelson’s evidence stands in direct
contradiction to the observational evidence cited by Cann and Yates,
who find that the use of judicial elections is associated with lower
levels of judicial legitimacy.31  Likewise, Benesh finds that the use of
partisan elections is associated with a decrease in confidence in the
“courts in your community.”32  Other studies find no relationship be-
tween the use of judicial elections and citizen perception of their state
judiciaries.33
A set of studies by Gibson demonstrate that the trappings of judi-
cial campaigns have predictable effects on public evaluations of judi-
cial legitimacy.  Indeed, contrary to concerns of many in the wake of
the Supreme Court’s decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White, there is no evidence that public statements of policy positions
by judges are associated with lower judgments of the legitimacy of
judicial institutions.34
There is evidence that Kentuckians penalize their state supreme
court in the face of attack advertising,35 though that effect dissipates
in a national sample.  Indeed, when Gibson asked Kentuckians to rate
the appropriateness of three real negative advertisements used in judi-
cial elections in that state, respondents broadly indicated that such ad-
vertisements were appropriate.36  The exception was an advertisement
that strayed away from policy disagreement and suggested the
targeted judge was a typical politician.37  Finally, in a multi-wave
panel survey, Gibson and colleagues evaluated change in support for
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court over the course of an election cy-
cle.38  In this experiment, subjects viewed television advertisements;
30. Michael J. Nelson, The Sky is Not Falling: Judicial Elections and Support for State Courts,
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 217–33 (Chris W. Bonneau & Melinda Gann Hall
eds., 2016).
31. DAMON M. CANN & JEFF YATES, THESE ESTIMABLE COURTS:  UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC
PERCEPTIONS OF STATE JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS AND LEGAL POLICY-MAKING 104 (2016); see
also Damon M. Cann & Jeff Yates, Homegrown Institutional Legitimacy: Assessing Citizens’ Dif-
fuse Support for State Courts, 36 AM. POL. RES. 297, 316 (2008) (finding that judicial elections
only have deleterious consequences on the legitimacy of state supreme courts among respon-
dents with low levels of political information).
32. Sara C. Benesh, Understanding Public Confidence in American Courts, 68 J. POL. 697,
701–02 (2006).
33. Christine A. Kelleher & Jennifer Wolak, Explaining Public Confidence in the Branches of
State Government, 60 POL. RES. Q. 707, 715 (2007).
34. Gibson, supra note 3, at 70.
35. Id. at 64.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 62.
38. James L. Gibson et al., The Effects of Judicial Campaign Activity on the Legitimacy of
Courts: A Survey-Based Experiment, 64 POL. RES. Q. 545, 545–46 (2011).
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those respondents who viewed negative advertisements had less sup-
port for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  The authors concluded
that “the message of most ads is that ‘courts are the same as other
political institutions,’ a message that tarnishes support based on the
presumption that the judiciary should be a nonpolitical branch of gov-
ernment.”39  Again, the harm comes from the connection between
judges and “typical” political activity.40
Campaign contributions represent a final type of campaign activity
with effects on legitimacy that have been examined by scholars.  Many
advocates fear that campaigns harm support for state supreme courts
because they make judges beholden to the litigants (or their lawyers)
who eventually appear before them.  Indeed, the Florida Supreme
Court has recognized this possibility, writing that a ban on direct solic-
itations of donors by judicial campaigns was justified due to “a com-
pelling state interest in preserving the integrity of [its] judiciary and
maintaining the public’s confidence in an impartial judiciary.”41  There
is broad support for the proposition that campaign contributions harm
public support for courts.  Gibson finds that learning a judge has ac-
cepted campaign contributions reduces support for a state supreme
court.42  Additionally, Cann and Yates report that citizens concerned
about campaign contributions tend to ascribe lower levels of legiti-
macy to their state supreme court.43
In short, there is an accumulating body of evidence that campaign
conduct by individual justices can contaminate their constituents’ sup-
port for the institutions in which they hope to serve.  The relationships
between judges and donors represents a potentially fraught issue for
the legitimacy of courts.  With that in mind, I now turn to a discussion
of trends in campaign finance in state courts over the past two
decades.
39. Id. at 553.
40. Importantly, despite claims like Dahl’s famous dictate that “much of the legitimacy of the
Court’s decisions rests upon the fiction that it is not a political institution but exclusively a legal
one . . . .”,  there is little evidence that legal realists are less supportive of courts than strict legal
realists.  Robert E. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. LAW. 279, 280 (1957).  James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has
Legal Realism Damaged the Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 195,
197–98 (2011); Gibson et al., supra note 24, at 545.
41. Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1664 (2015).
42. Gibson, supra note 3, at 62.
43. Cann & Yates, Homegrown, supra note 31, at 316.
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C. The Campaign Finance Landscape in Judicial Elections
The notion that campaign contributions are harmful to public sup-
port for courts is particularly noteworthy when considering campaign
finance changes in judicial elections over the past three decades.  A
report by the Brennan Center for Justice, in collaboration with the
National Institute for Money in State Politics, noted that “[c]ampaign
fundraising more than doubled, from $83.3 million in 1990–1999 to
$206.9 million in 2000–2009 . . . .  All but two of the twenty-two states
with contestable Supreme Court elections had their costliest-ever con-
tests in the 2000–2009 decade.”44  A similar report analyzing the
2013–2014 election cycle found that over 90% of contested state su-
preme court elections were won by the candidate who raised the most
money.45
The sources of these campaign funds are varied.  Bonneau finds that
the percentage of campaign spending by candidates dropped from
over 90% in 2002 to less than 60% in 2012 and 2014, noting that an
increase in spending by outside groups moves control away from can-
didates, leaving the outside groups free to dictate the issues, tone, and
content of the electoral contest.46  In short, outside spending in judi-
cial elections has increased markedly in the past decade-and-a-half.
Aside from individual and independent support, a third type of
campaign support has become increasingly common in judicial races.
This third type of support—dark money support—refers to “untrace-
able political spending.”47  “Dark money is money that has been
routed through an opaque nonprofit—thus concealing its true source
from voters and investors alike.  The source of dark money could be
individuals, unions, associations, nonprofits, or for-profit busi-
nesses.”48  While often linked to the Supreme Court’s decision in Citi-
zens United, that ruling was not the origin of dark money in U.S.
elections, nor, according to Professor Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, is it the
44. James Sample et al., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2000–2009: DECADE OF
CHANGE, https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/JAS-NPJE-Decade-ONLINE
.pdf; Cf. Chris W. Bonneau, Fundraising and Spending in State Supreme Court Elections, JUDI-
CIAL ELECTIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 84 (Chris W. Bonneau & Melinda Gann Hall eds., 2016)
(finding “while state supreme court elections are not cheap, campaign fundraising is not chang-
ing in any kind of escalating manner.  In fact, if anything, candidates are raising less money in
recent years than they were at the beginning of the [2000] decade”).
45. SCOTT GREYTAK ET AL., BANKROLLING THE BENCH: THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS 2 (2015) (spending over this election cycle was over $34.5 million).
46. Bonneau, supra note 46, at 87.
47. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Dark Money, Black Hole Money, and How to Solve It, AM. CONST.
SOC’Y 2.2 (2015), https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/2_Dark_Money_Black_Hole_Money_
and_How_to_Solve_It.pdf.
48. Id.
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reason for the increase in dark money seen since 2010.49  Indeed, that
ruling upheld—by an 8-1 vote—the constitutionality of disclosure
requirements.50
Still, the involvement of dark money groups in judicial elections is
not rare.  Consider the 2016 primary elections in the six states that
used television advertising.  The Brennan Center for Justice reports
that candidates were only responsible for about one-third of television
advertising in these races, and dark money groups were responsible
for airing 70% of non-candidate advertisements.51  The 2016 figures
represent a significant increase from past election cycles, suggesting
that the amount of dark money in judicial races is rising.
There is reason to believe these dark money contributions could be
especially harmful in judicial races because of the thinness of the in-
formation environment in these races.  As Professor Heather Gerken
puts it:
Judicial elections are one of the places where money is likely to
have the most corrosive effect.  The obvious reason, of course, is
that we have a different sense of the position (hence all the objec-
tions about judicial elections generally).  But I have an additional
worry that stems from my experience in election law.  In most in-
stances, big money funds races between the two major parties.
There, at least, voters have some background sense of the politics of
the candidates, which means that money may have less of an effect.
In judicial elections, however, the money may matter more because
we lack a “shorthand” (such as an identification with a political
party) to guide our votes.52
In other words, in judicial elections—and especially nonpartisan or
retention elections—voters lack the party cue on election day that can
counteract any misleading information heard from campaign adver-
tisements.  As a result, such spending may be particularly effective in
these races.
The public broadly supports campaign finance reform.  A 2015 As-
sociated Press-NORC poll asked respondents how effective they felt
specific forms of campaign finance reform would be at reducing the
influence of money in politics.  The results are fairly remarkable.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2.3.
51. BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, NEW ANALYSIS: 2016 JUDICIAL ELECTIONS SEE SECRET
MONEY AND HEIGHTENED OUTSIDE SPENDING, https://www.brennancenter.org/press-release/
new-analysis-2016-judicial-elections-see-secret-money-and-heightened-outside-spending (last
visited Oct. 1, 2017).
52. Heather K. Gerken, The Real Problem with Citizens United: Campaign Finance, Dark
Money, and Shadow Parties, MARQ. LAWS. 21 (2016), https://law.marquette.edu/assets/mar-
quette-lawyers/pdf/marquette-lawyer/2014-summer/2014-summer-p10.pdf.
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Only 13% of respondents felt that limiting how much an outside
group can spend on a candidate’s campaign would be ineffective at
reducing the influence of money in politics.53  Additionally, 15% of
respondents felt that limits on candidate spending would be ineffec-
tive, while only 13% of respondents felt that limits on spending by
political parties would be ineffective.54  In that same poll, 76% of re-
spondents expressed opposition to dark money in electoral campaigns,
answering that they felt that “all groups that raise and spend unlimited
money to support candidates should be required to publicly disclose
their contributors.”55  A 2015 CBS News/New York Times poll found
an almost identical result: 75% of respondents felt that “groups not
affiliated with a candidate that spend money during political cam-
paigns should be required to publicly disclose their contributors.”56
This discussion suggests three conclusions.  First, political science
studies discussing how campaigning affects support for judicial institu-
tions suggest that campaign contributions generally have deleterious
effects on the legitimacy of state supreme courts.  Second, the land-
scape of judicial campaigns has changed markedly since the early
1990s because campaign spending—and spending from outside groups
especially—is increasing significantly.  Finally, the public appears
broadly supportive of campaign finance reform efforts.
III. DARK MONEY, JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS, AND PUBLIC SUPPORT
FOR COURTS
Given public concerns about campaign finance reform, and dark
money especially, it is appropriate to examine how different types of
campaign support might affect public support for state supreme courts
and their judges.  Indeed, one might expect that the unique challenge
of judging exacerbates the effect of dark money contributions on sup-
port for courts because it creates ambiguities that, in turn, call into
question the fairness, impartiality, and legitimacy of state supreme
courts.
Dark money contributions might affect citizens’ perceptions of their
state supreme courts in one of two ways.  First, as Rich Robinson, the
Executive Director of the Michigan Campaign Finance Network, has
suggested:
53. Americans’ Views on Money in Politics, ASSOC. PRESS-NORC CTR. FOR PUB. AFFAIRS.
RES. 8–9 (2015).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 7.
56. Americans’ Views on Money in Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2017), www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2015/06/02/us/politics/money-in-politics-poll.html?mcubz=1.
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Nobody has the motivation to spend big money in a judicial race
like a litigant with a high-stakes case in the appeals pipeline.  Imag-
ine being in court opposing the person who financed the campaign
of the justice who is going to decide your case.  Imagine not know-
ing it, so you can’t make a legitimate motion for recusal. Dark
money undermines the whole premise of judicial impartiality.57
In other words, because the lack of disclosure requirements render
vague the relationship between a litigant and the support received by
a judicial candidate, it is unclear the extent to which the two are
linked.  Accordingly, in the wake of dark money, support for courts
(especially perceptions of fairness and impartiality) might suffer be-
cause citizens judge harshly candidates who do not speak out against
such support, thereby dirtying their hands in the eyes of voters.
A second possibility is implied by Professor Torres-Spelliscy who
suggests that “because of the dark money problem, Americans often
don’t know what they don’t know about money in politics.”58  In this
sense, such contributions are “out of sight, out of mind” for the public:
because they do not and cannot know whether there is a relationship
between the litigant and the support, they are unlikely to penalize the
court or judge when they learn of such support.  In this way, just as
dark money obscures the relationship between the donor and the ob-
ject of the donor’s support, it also shields the object of that support
from public reprisal for that support.
Indeed, this second possibility seems particularly likely given the
relatively low levels of awareness that most citizens have about their
state supreme courts.  When these institutions operate out of sight
(and mind) of voters, voters are unlikely to acquire the information
necessary to (1) learn about a particular case the state supreme court
is hearing, (2) learn about the support the judges of that court re-
ceived in their last election, and (3) combine that information to come
to a judgement about their support for their state supreme court.59
As a result, the first hypothesis of this study is that dark money
contributions have less deleterious effects on support for state supreme
courts than direct litigant support.
Aside from the source of the support, the timing of the support
might matter as well.  The adage is that “time heals all wounds.”
57. Rich Robinson, Culture of Dark Money, DOME MAG. (Dec. 21, 2012), http://domemaga
zine.com/robinson/rr122112
58. Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 47, at 2.3.
59. James L. Gibson et al., Updating Supreme Court Legitimacy: Testing the “Rule, Learn,
Update” Model of Political Communication, 54 AM. POL. RES. (forthcoming 2017); Michael J.
Nelson & Patrick Tucker, The Dynamics of U.S. Supreme Court Legitimacy, (Working Paper,
2017).
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Here, the passage of time might lead voters to conclude that the ac-
ceptance of campaign support is temporally distant enough to mitigate
the deleterious consequences of accepting that campaign support.  In-
deed, even if citizens do learn about such support, the political science
literature suggests that changes in support are likely fleeting, regener-
ating to equilibrium levels over time.60  More practically, voters are
busy people, and most do not fret (or even think) about the campaign
support received by their state supreme court justices on a daily basis.
If voters do not know or remember the campaign support, they are
unable to penalize their state supreme court for that support.
As a result, the second hypothesis of this study is that the effect of
campaign support on support for state supreme courts dissipates with
time.
IV. THE SURVEY
To examine the extent to which public perceptions of courts are af-
fected by campaign contributions, especially those made by litigants, I
conducted an experiment using the Amazon Mechanical Turk plat-
form on March 7–10, 2017.  The beginning of the survey asked respon-
dents about their demographic characteristics and their background
knowledge of their state supreme court.  Then, respondents were ex-
posed to a short, fictional vignette of a ruling by their state supreme
court.  Finally, I asked respondents about: (a) their perceptions of fair-
ness and impartiality, (b) their willingness to vote for the judge who
received the campaign contributions, and (c) the legitimacy of their
state supreme court.
A. The Survey Experiment
The survey vignette was based heavily upon one used by Gibson
and Caldeira to study the extent to which recusals mitigate the delete-
rious consequences of campaign support by litigants in both West Vir-
ginia and in a national sample of Americans.61  However, where the
Gibson and Caldeira experiment manipulated a number of character-
istics of the decision, I manipulate only two: (1) the identity of the
donor who provided campaign support to the judge and (2) the timing
of the campaign support.
60. Jeffrey J. Mondak & Shannon Ishiyama Smithey, The Dynamics of Public Support for the
Supreme Court, 59 J. POL. 1114, 1119 (1997).
61. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Campaign Support, Conflicts of Interest, and
Judicial Impartiality: Can Recusals Rescue the Legitimacy of Courts?, 74 J. POL. 18, 33 (2012);
James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Judicial Impartiality, Campaign Contributions, and
Recusals: Results from a National Survey, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 76, 78–79 (2013).
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Realism is always an issue with vignette experiments, so I took
pains to model the dispute in the vignette after a state supreme court
decision: Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Com-
pany.62  According to The New Politics of Judicial Elections 2000-
2009:
Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. involved the most
expensive state judicial campaign in United States history, a 2004
contest in which Illinois Appellate Judge Gordon Maag and then-
circuit Judge Lloyd Karmeier raised a total of $9.3 million.
Karmeier, who received over $350,000 in direct contributions from
employees, lawyers and others linked to State Farm Insurance, and
over $1 million more from groups of which State Farm was a mem-
ber or to which it contributed, won the election.
Justice Karmeier then refused to recuse himself from Avery, which,
as the timeline illustrates, was pending before the Illinois Supreme
Court during the entire campaign.  The stakes in Avery were hardly
trivial. Justice Karmeier cast the decisive vote to reverse a verdict
on breach of claims valued at over $450 million against State Farm
(57).63
I recast the dispute into one involving a fictional insurance com-
pany, Golden Eagle Insurance, and a fictional Justice Smith.  I kept
the size of the verdict—$450 million—and the general issue at dispute
in the appeal: whether or not the insurance company needed to reim-
burse plaintiffs for authorizing faulty repairs.
First, respondents were randomly presented with campaign support
from one of three possible sources.  In the first (“Direct Support”)
condition, a litigant provided campaign support directly to the candi-
date, enabling the candidate to purchase television advertising.  In the
second (“Independent Support”) condition, the litigant provided inde-
pendent campaign support, airing television advertisements on behalf
of the judge, but not with the blessing of the candidate.  In the third
(“Dark Support”) condition, a group whose donors are unknown
aired television advertisements on behalf of the candidate.
Formally, the options were:
• “the American Insurance Partnership, a group of insurance
companies that includes Golden Eagle Insurance.  The group
gave campaign contributions which allowed Smith to pay for TV
ads urging voters to elect Smith.”
62. Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 216 Ill. 2d 100 (2005).
63. Sample et al., supra note 44, at 57.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\67-2\DPL201.txt unknown Seq: 15  2-MAR-18 14:57
2018] DARK MONEY AND SUPPORT FOR STATE COURTS201
• “the American Insurance Partnership, a group of insurance
companies that includes Golden Eagle Insurance.  The group in-
dependently paid for TV ads urging voters to elect Smith.”
• “the American Insurance Partnership, a group that does not dis-
close its donors.  The group independently paid for TV ads urg-
ing voters to elect Smith.”
Second, the timing of the support was varied across the three condi-
tions.  Half of the respondents learned that the support was provided
to the candidate for an electoral contest that took place “Last Novem-
ber” while the remaining respondents were told that the support was
provided “About Eight Years ago.”  In all versions of the vignette,
respondents were told three additional pieces of information: (a) that
the Court ruled in favor of the insurance company, (b) that Justice
Smith cast the deciding vote on the decision, and (c) that the size of
the campaign support was “quite large and therefore likely to have
had some impact” on the electoral campaign.  These three pieces of
information raise the salience of the campaign support on the ruling
and make it particularly likely that any experimental effects are high.
As a result, a natural extension of this study is to vary one or more of
these features to examine the extent to which the effects of campaign
support are mitigated in the face of a ruling against the donor, the
political cover provided by judicial unanimity, or a small amount of
campaign support.64
Taken together, the design is a 3 x 2 factorial design with six differ-
ent versions of the vignette.  The version of the vignette hypothesized
to have the greatest negative effect on court support is:
Last week, the [State] Supreme Court decided a case involving the
Golden Eagle Insurance Company.  Golden Eagle Insurance asked
the Court to decide that it did not have to pay a group of its custom-
ers $450 million dollars for faulty repairs it authorized.  Reversing
the decision of the previous court, the [State] Supreme Court de-
cided that Golden Eagle did not have to pay $450 million to its cus-
tomers.  Justice Smith cast the deciding vote on the decision.  Last
November, when he was first elected to the Court, Justice Smith
received the support of the American Insurance Partnership, a
group that does not disclose its donors.  The group independently
paid for TV ads urging voters to elect Smith.
The contributions provided by the American Insurance Partnership
were quite large and therefore likely to have had some impact on
Justice Smith’s successful electoral campaign.
64. This is exactly the approach taken by Gibson and Caldeira, supra note 61, at 21–22, 25–26.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\67-2\DPL201.txt unknown Seq: 16  2-MAR-18 14:57
202 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:187
B. The Sample: Amazon Mechanical Turk
Respondents were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
(MTurk) platform and were compensated $0.50 for completing the
short, six to eight minute survey.  The nature of the sample raises two
important questions.  First, to what extent does the sample have char-
acteristics that mirror the American people (or the characteristics of
other surveys)?  Second, to what extent was the randomization em-
ployed in the experiment successful at ensuring balance among demo-
graphic characteristics across experimental conditions?
Mechanical Turk samples, unlike most phone or internet surveys,
are convenience samples rather than nationally representative surveys
of the American people.  Only those respondents who choose to com-
plete tasks (called “hits”) on the Mechanical Turk platform are among
the group of individuals who could be polled.  Moreover, respondents
choose which surveys and tasks they want to complete, creating poten-
tial self-selection issues.
Internet Samples Face to Face
Christenson Berinsky, ANES-P ANES
Sample and Glick Huber, Lenz 2008-09 2008
% Female 47.5 54.4 60.1 57.6 55
% White 82.3 79 83.5 83 79.1
% Black 7.6 7.9 4.4 8.9 12
% Hispanic 7.3 5 6.7 5 9.1
Mean Age
(Yrs) 38.6 33.4 32.3 49.7 46.6
Ideology (7 pt.) 3.51 3.3 3.4 4.3 4.2
Education 53% Col Grad 50% Col Grad 14.9 yrs 16.2 yrs 13.5 yrs
32% Some Col 37% Some Col
Table 1: Comparison of Sample Demographics. ANES-P is the American National Election Panel
Study conducted by Knowledge Networks and the ANES is the American National Election Study.
Data from the ANES are weighted. Data for Christenson and Glick comes from Table A1 of their
article; data for the remaining columns comes from Table 3 in Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012.
Luckily, political scientists have shown that Mechanical Turk sam-
ples perform similarly to high quality internet surveys widely used by
political scientists.65  As a demonstration, Table 1 compares the char-
acteristics of my sample to those used by Christenson and Glick, the
Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz MTurk sample, the 2008-2009 American
National Election Panel Study (a web-based panel survey), and the
65. Adam J. Berinsky et al., Evaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental Research:
Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk, 20 POL. ANALYSIS 351, 356–57 (2012); Michael Buhrmester,
Tracy Kwang & Samuel D. Gosling, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk A New Source of Inexpensive,
Yet High-Quality, Data?, 6 PERSP. PSY. SCI. 3 (2011).
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2008 American National Election Study, a well-known face-to-face
survey.
Overall, my sample is fairly representative.  Its average age is mark-
edly older than the other Mechanical Turk samples and has a higher
amount of Latino representation than any of the internet samples.  A
common critique of Mechanical Turk convenience samples is their lib-
eral bent.  This is still true in this sample; however, it is closer to the
average ideology (measured on a seven-point scale) of the nationally
representative surveys than either of the other Mechanical Turk sam-
ples.  Overall, the demographic comparison underscores the conclu-
sion that Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz reached about Mechanical Turk
samples:
the MTurk sample does not perfectly match the demographic and
attitudinal characteristics of the U.S. population but does not pre-
sent a wildly distorted view of the U.S. population either.  Statisti-
cally significant differences exist between the MTurk sample and the
benchmark surveys, but these differences are substantively small.
MTurk samples will often be more diverse than convenience sam-
ples and will always be more diverse than student samples.66
Or, as Christensen and Glick put it,
the MTurk sample deviates from the gold standard surveys in im-
portant ways and should never be considered a valid substitute for
making population estimates.  On the other hand . . . many devia-
tions are relatively minor and that on some important metrics the
MTurk sample is more similar to the ANES than the ANES panel.67
Independent
Direct Support Support Dark Support p-value
% Female 45.90% 52.42% 44.11% 0.13
% White 83.96% 80.51% 82.58% 0.57
% Black 7.84% 8.46% 6.44% 0.67
% Hispanic 7.09% 6.62% 8.33% 0.74
Age (Years) 38.25 39.40 38.00 0.40
Ideology (mean 7 pt.) 3.51 3.49 3.55 0.94
Education (mean 8 pt.) 6.11 6.02 5.93 0.40
N 268 272 264
Table 2: Balance By Support Condition.  The p-values for the first four rows are from Chi2 tests.  The p-
values from the remaining rows are from one-way ANOVA models.
The second consideration concerns the extent to which the
randomization was effective at balancing assignment to condition
across various demographic characteristics.  Table 2 compares the bal-
ance of assignment to condition across the three donation treatments.
66. Id. at 361.
67. Christenson & Glick, supra note 24, at 403.
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Overall, the randomization was very successful; no demographic char-
acteristic shows statistically significant evidence of imbalance.
However, the randomization was less successful for the temporal
manipulation.  Here, a higher percentage of men (57.61%) than
women (42.39%) received vignettes where the campaign support
came in the last year (p-value: 0.004).  Likewise, the group of respon-
dents assigned to learn about campaign support in the last election
was significantly younger (mean: 37.24 years) than the group who
learned about campaign support eight years ago (mean: 39.88).   There
were no statistically significant differences across the two conditions
on any other covariate.
C. The Outcome Variables
I analyze three separate outcome variables in this study: (a) percep-
tions of fairness and impartiality, (b) a citizen’s willingness to support
the judge in an upcoming election, and (c) the legitimacy of state su-
preme courts.
I used the three-question battery employed by Gibson and Caldeira
to measure perceptions of fairness and impartiality.68  The questions,
and their response sets, are:
Which best describes your view of Justice Smith’s ability as a judge?
• I strongly believe that Justice Smith can be fair and impartial.
• I somewhat believe that Justice Smith can be fair and impartial.
• I somewhat believe that Justice Smith cannot be fair and
impartial.
• I strongly believe that Justice Smith cannot be fair and impartial.
Assume for the moment that all judges on the [State Supreme
Court] were selected in the same circumstances as Justice Smith.
 Would you consider the state supreme court:
• A very legitimate institution
• A somewhat legitimate institution
• Not a very legitimate institution
• Not legitimate at all
How likely are you to accept decisions made by Justice Smith as
impartial and fair?
• Very Likely
• Somewhat Likely
68. Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 61, at 25.
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• Not Too Likely
• Not at all Likely
The items scale well together.  The average interitem covariance is
0.51 and the Cronbach’s alpha for the scale is 0.87.69  The three items
load onto a single factor with loadings of 0.77 or higher.70  The factor
analysis combines the respondents’ scores into a single number be-
tween zero and one. Higher values mean more legitimacy.  The varia-
ble has a mean of 0.33 and a standard deviation of 0.25.
To measure vote choice, I examined responses on a 4-point scale to
the following question: “How likely would you be to vote for Justice
Smith in the next judicial election?”  Most respondents were not likely
to vote for Justice Smith again with a slight majority (51%) of respon-
dents falling at the lower endpoint of the scale.  The mean of the vari-
able is 1.69 with a standard deviation of 0.82.
Following the work of Gibson and Caldeira,71 I measured the legiti-
macy of state supreme courts using the following three questions:
• If the [State Supreme Court] started making a lot of decisions
that most people disagree with, it might be better to do away
with the supreme court altogether.
• The [State Supreme Court] gets too mixed up in politics.
• The [State Supreme Court] ought to be made less independent
so that it listens a lot more to what the people want.
The three items scale together moderately well.  The scale is fairly
reliable, with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.63 and an average interitem
covariance of 0.44.  When the three items are loaded onto a single
factor, the loadings are 0.59, 0.45, and 0.62, slightly lower than one
would hope.  The variable has a mean of 0.52 and a standard deviation
of 0.21.
69. Covariance is a statistical measure that assesses the relationship between two variables;
larger covariances indicate that two variables are more strongly related to one another. ALAN
AGRESTI & BARBARA FINLAY, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 425 (4th ed.
2009).  According to Braumoeller, “Cronbach’s alpha is a worthwhile measure of intercoder reli-
ability, with values below 0.60 considered clearly problematic, those in the 0.60–0.69 range bor-
derline (acceptable by some scholars but not others), 0.70–0.79 acceptable, and 0.80 and above
very strong.”  Bear F. Braumoeller, Systemic Politics and the Origins of Great Power Conflict,
102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 77, 90 (2008).
70. According to an introductory statistics textbook, factor analysis is “a multivariate statisti-
cal method used for a wide variety of purposes” including “Reducing a large number of factors
to a smaller number of statistically uncorrelated variables, the factors of factor analysis.”
AGRESTI & FINLAY, supra note 71, at 533.  A factor loading is “The correlation of a variable with
a factor.” Higher factor loadings therefore indicate better item fit. Id.
71. Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 61, at 23, 25, 31.
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V. RESULTS
We examine the results of the experiment in three steps.  First, we
analyze the support manipulation, analyzing whether support for
courts decreases in the presence of campaign support from dark
money groups.  Second, we analyze the time manipulation, looking for
evidence that the deleterious effects of campaign support dissipate
with time.  Finally, we analyze the two manipulations jointly to deter-
mine whether the effect of a particular type of campaign support var-
ies with the timing of that support.
A. The Support Manipulation
Figure 1. Average Perceived Fairness by Support Condition.  The bars re-
present 95% confidence intervals.  Higher values on the y-axis indicate
higher levels of perceived fairness.
We begin our analysis of the data by examining differences in per-
ceived fairness across the three different support conditions.  Overall,
there is strong evidence that support varies across the three condi-
tions.  A one-way ANOVA analysis provides clear support to reject
the hypothesis that average levels of perceived fairness are the same
across the three conditions (p<0.01).72
72. An ANOVA (analysis of variance) is an “inferential method for comparing several
means.” AGRESTI & FINLAY, supra note 69, at 369.
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The ANOVA analysis only tells us that there are differences be-
tween the three conditions, but it does not tell us what those differ-
ences are.  To this end, Figure 1 plots mean levels of perceived fairness
for each condition.  The overwhelming conclusion from the graph is
that perceived fairness is higher in the presence of dark money sup-
port than for either type of direct litigant support.  Moreover, while
there are statistically significant differences between the Dark Sup-
port and Direct Support (p<0.01) and Independent Support (p<0.01)
conditions, respondents in the Direct and Independent Support condi-
tions held views that were indistinguishable from one another
(p=0.76).  This result differs from that reported by the Gibson and
Caldeira samples; those samples were more likely to report lower
levels of perceived fairness in the face of direct support than indepen-
dent support.73
Figure 2. Average Vote Intention by Support Condition.  The bars represent
95% confidence intervals.  Higher values on the y-axis indicate higher will-
ingness to vote for Justice Smith in the next election.
Second, recall that respondents were also asked about the likeli-
hood that they would support Justice Smith in the next election.  Re-
spondents provided their responses on a four-point scale and a one-
73. Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 61, at 32.
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way ANOVA analysis indicates statistically significant differences
across conditions (p=0.04).
Again, it is easiest to look to a figure to examine the differences
across conditions.  Figure 2 plots the average responses to this ques-
tion across the three conditions.  The same pattern holds.  There are
statistically significant differences between the Dark Support condi-
tion and the other two conditions (p=0.02 and p=0.05 respectively) but
no differences between the two conditions in which respondents were
directly informed that the litigant in the case supported Justice Smith
(p=0.77).
Figure 3. Average Legitimacy by Support Condition.  The bars represent
95% confidence intervals.  Higher values on the y-axis indicate higher levels
of perceived legitimacy.
Finally, respondents provided assessments of their state supreme
court’s legitimacy in light of the decision.  The one-way ANOVA anal-
ysis indicates no statistically significant differences across conditions
(p=0.82).  Moreover, as Figure 3 shows, there are no statistically sig-
nificant differences between the conditions.  In short, there is no evi-
dence that the type of campaign support received by the judge has
differentially deleterious consequences on the institution’s legitimacy.
Taken together, the results of the support manipulation provide
clear evidence that respondents viewed support by a dark money
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group as very different than direct support from the litigant.  Respon-
dents were more likely to perceive decisions made by a judge who had
received dark money as fairer than those in which a judge received
direct support from the litigant.  However, respondents did not differ-
entiate among the manner in which the litigant provided support: re-
gardless of whether the contribution was given directly to the judicial
candidate or used independently, respondents were indistinguishably
disdainful of the judge.74
There is an important contextual note to make about these results.
In all three conditions in the experiment, the judge received campaign
support from an industry-related group.  Gibson has shown in a vari-
ety of works that the receipt of campaign contributions generally does
harm perceptions of judicial legitimacy.75  On the whole, the public is
tolerant of judicial campaigns: in this sample, roughly half (48.4%) of
respondents thought that a “good state supreme court justice” should
air television advertisements during campaigns to inform the public of
their views.  However, more than three-quarters (77.3%) of respon-
dents felt that a good state supreme court justice should refuse to ac-
cept any campaign contributions from anyone while about half of
respondents (45.9%) felt that good justices should publicly condemn
television advertisements made by groups who do not disclose their
donors.  Thus, while this experiment is unable to determine this fact
definitively, it is likely that support from dark money groups mitigates
the harm caused by campaign contributions.  It is almost certainly not
the case that support from dark money groups actually increases sup-
port for a decision.
B. The Time Manipulation
Having addressed the effects of the support manipulation, we now
consider the second manipulation—time.  Recall that half of respon-
dents were randomly assigned to read about campaign support that
happened in “Last November’s Election.”  The other half of respon-
74. Of course, not all states elect their judges, and 18% of the respondents reported living in a
state that does not use judicial elections to retain their judges.  This may raise issues of cognitive
dissonance for those respondents who know that their state supreme court does not use judicial
elections.  Indeed, when asked whether their state supreme court stands for election, 39.3% of
respondents gave an incorrect response; this is similar to the result in Nelson, supra note 30, at
10–11, which reports that a slight majority of a National Center for State Courts-funded survey
did not know whether their state supreme court stands for election.  When the sample is subset
to only those respondents who live in states that elect their judges, the results for fairness and
legitimacy hold while the p-value for the ANOVA test of vote intention rises above the 0.05
threshold.
75. Gibson et al., supra note 3, at 1.
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dents learned of campaign support that was provided “About 8 Years
Ago.”  I predicted that respondents would be more tolerant of past
campaign support than recent campaign support.
That does not appear to be the case.  Overall, there was no statisti-
cally significant difference in perceived fairness (p=0.09), vote inten-
tion (p=0.49), or perceived legitimacy (p=0.995) based on the time
manipulation to which respondents were assigned.  Moreover, the lack
of a statistically significant difference is not due to a lack of precision
in the estimates.  For example, the mean level of legitimacy for those
in the “Last November” condition was 0.561 while the analogous
value for those in the “Eight Years Ago” condition was 0.561.  The
two values are identical.
In other words, across none of the three dependent variables is
there statistically significant evidence that the passage of time miti-
gates issues with campaign support.  Indeed, respondents are equally
punitive in their assessments of Justice Smith regardless of when he
received support from the insurance industry.
C. The Interaction of Donation and Time
Figure 4. Average Perceived Fairness by Condition.  The bars represent 95%
confidence intervals.  Higher values on the y-axis indicate higher levels of
perceived fairness.
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The next stage of the analysis is to analyze whether the support con-
ditions have different effects on respondents’ perceptions of Justice
Smith based on the timing of the support.  Figure 4 plots average val-
ues of fairness across each of the six experimental treatments.  The
left-hand portion of the plot provides the values for each support con-
dition when the support occurred “Last November,” while the right-
hand lines display the means for the “Eight Years Ago” conditions.
“Last November” condition respondents who learned that Justice
Smith received direct contributions from the industry have percep-
tions of fairness that are lower at a statistically significant level than
the perceptions of those respondents who learned of dark money sup-
port (p<0.01).  However, accounting for the time treatment removes
the statistically significant difference between the perceptions of re-
spondents in the Independent Support and Dark Support conditions,
though the plot shows that average levels of fairness generally in-
crease as the type of support that Justice Smith received becomes less
directly tied to the litigant in the case.
Interestingly, that linear relationship does not hold in the “Eight
Years Ago” treatment.  Here, there is a statistically significant differ-
ence between the perceptions of respondents in the Independent Sup-
port and Dark Support conditions (p<0.01), but no difference between
the perceptions of fairness between these respondents and those re-
spondents in the Direct Support category.  The fact that perceptions
of fairness are particularly low among respondents in the “Direct Sup-
port-Last November” and “Independent Support-Eight Years Ago”
treatments is particularly puzzling, but it is a pattern that shows up in
the vote intention outcome (not provided here) as well.  Indeed, re-
spondents seemed somewhat likely to penalize those judges who re-
ceived the independent support “Eight Years Ago,” though the
difference is not statistically significant.
Importantly, however, one should exercise caution before reading
too much into these interactive results.  A two-way ANOVA analysis
indicates that there is no statistically significant interactive effect be-
tween the two manipulations in the perceived fairness outcome
(p=0.12), the vote intention outcome (p=0.06), and the legitimacy out-
come (p=0.32). Indeed, it seems that the effects (or lack thereof) of
the two manipulations are independent.
D. Multivariate Analysis
The analysis to this point has suggested three major conclusions.
First, respondents punish incumbent judges less for dark money sup-
port than for direct or indirect support from a litigant’s industry.  Sec-
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ond, forgiveness is hard.  The passage of time does not ameliorate
respondents’ misgivings about campaign support and there is no dif-
ference in their perceptions of fairness, legitimacy, or vote intention
based on the timing of the campaign support.  Finally, the irrelevance
of time holds even when one examines the interactive effect of the
type of support and the timing of the support; for no outcome was
there a statistically significant interaction between the two
manipulations.
However, there may be treatment heterogeneity in the effect of the
variables based upon respondents’ perceptions of their state supreme
court or their expectations for a good state supreme court justice.  To
this end, the final step in the analysis is to conduct a multivariate re-
gression analysis.
The regression analysis includes a number of control variables.
First, modifying the scale used by Gibson and Nelson,76 I examine the
extent to which perceptions of the politicization of the judiciary con-
found the analysis.  The measure of perceived politicization is based
upon respondents’ answers to the following three statements:
• State supreme court judges are little more than politicians in
robes.
• State supreme court justices can be trusted to tell us why they
actually decide the way they do, rather than hiding some ulterior
motives for their decisions.
• State supreme court justices may say their decisions are based
on law and the Constitution, but in many cases, judges make
decisions because they think voters will like them.
The three items scale relatively well, with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.65,
an average interitem covariance of 0.43, and factor loadings above
0.50.
The respondents answered a standard battery of demographic ques-
tions, yielding data about their gender, age, ethnicity, race, social class
(home ownership), education (on an 8-point scale), partisanship, and
ideology (on a 7-point scale, higher values indicate more conserva-
tism). I measured knowledge of the state judiciary with three ques-
tions, modified from those used by Gibson:
• Some judges in the American states must run for reelection to
remain in office; others do not.  Do you happen to know if the
justices of the [State Supreme Court] must run for reelection to
remain in office?
76. Gibson & Nelson, supra note 22, at 25.
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• Some judges in the American states serve for a set number of
years; others serve automatically until retirement.  Do you know
if the justices of the [State Supreme Court] serve for a set num-
ber of years or whether they serve until retirement?
• When there is a conflict over the meaning of your state’s Consti-
tution, do you know who has the last say—is it the state supreme
court, the state legislature, or the governor?
I used an additive scale of correct answers to the questions to con-
struct a measure of court knowledge.  2.6% of respondents answered
no knowledge questions correctly, 32.2% of respondents answered
one question correctly, 30.4% of respondents answered two questions
correctly, and 34.8% of respondents answered all three questions
correctly.77
Finally, to mirror the model specification used by Gibson and Nel-
son, I include in the legitimacy models the standard job performance
and “about right” measures of specific support as well as two indica-
tors of democratic values.  About one-third of respondents are dissat-
isfied with the performance of their state supreme court, while 48.1%
of respondents indicated that the policies of their state supreme court
were “about right” rather than “too liberal” or “too conservative.”
The two democratic values measures were responses on a 5-point
scale to two questions: “It is not necessary to obey a law you consider
unjust” (20.4% disagree) and “It is better to live in an orderly society
than to allow people so much freedom that they can become disrup-
tive” (36.3% disagree).
The most important, and most obvious, conclusion from the mul-
tivariate linear regression models displayed in Table 3 is the statisti-
cally significant effect of the Dark Support treatment on perceptions
of fairness and vote intention.  This provides additional support for
the first conclusion discussed above: even in a multivariate analysis,
perceptions of fairness and vote intention are higher in the face of
support from a dark money group than when the support is from the
litigant either directly or independently.
Second, after controlling numerous characteristics, there is evidence
of a statistically significant effect between the timing of the support
and perceptions of fairness.  The direction of the effect fits with theo-
retical expectations: when the support is more recent, perceptions of
fairness decline.
77. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Knowing the Supreme Court? A Reconsideration
of Public Ignorance of the High Court, 71 J. POL. 429, 434 (2009).
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(1) (2) (3)
Fairness Vote Intention Legitimacy
Independent 0.01 0.01 0.00
Support (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Dark Support 0.06* 0.05* 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Last November -0.04* -0.02 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Politicization -0.31* -0.21* -0.30*
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Female -0.01 0.00 -0.04*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Hispanic 0.05 0.10* 0.01
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Black 0.04 0.10* -0.02
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Own Home 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Court Knowledge -0.02 -0.02 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Education 0.00 0.00 0.03*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Democrat 0.02 0.03 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Republican 0.02 0.03 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Ideology 0.03* 0.03* -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age -0.00* -0.00* 0.00*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Specific Support: 0.02
Job Performance (0.01)
Specific Support: 0.05*
“About Right” (0.02)
Support for Rule 0.01*
Of Law (0.01)
Order vs. Liberty 0.03*
(0.01)
Intercept 0.50* 0.36* 0.23*
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
R2 0.12 0.10 0.27
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.08 0.25
N 778 786 777
Table 3. Multivariate linear regression models. * indicates statistical significance at p<0.05. To assist
with comparability, all three outcome variables are scaled from 0 to 1.
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Third, extending the findings of Gibson and Nelson to state
supreme courts and to perceptions of fairness and vote intention,
Table 3 suggests a statistically significant and substantively important
role for perceptions of politicization in affecting respondents’
perceptions of courts and judges.  Indeed, the substantive effect of
perceived politicization dwarfs that of any other predictor in the table,
making it both statistically and substantively important.
The important role that perceptions of politicization play in shaping
all three outcomes illustrates the grave threat that perceived
politicization poses to the legitimacy of state supreme courts.  Indeed,
recall that the three outcome variables range from 0 to 1.  The 0.06
coefficient for Dark Support in Model 1 indicates that respondents in
the Dark Support condition have a predicted value of fairness that is
0.06 higher than respondents in the Direct Support condition.  In
other words, the effect of Dark Support is minor, accounting for 6%
of the possible range of perceived fairness.  Perceived politicization,
on the other hand, accounts for a change of one-third of the entire
range of fairness, vote choice, and legitimacy as perceptions of
perceived politicization move from minimum to maximum values.
Finally, there is a stunning lack of treatment heterogeneity between
the three support conditions and respondents’ perceptions of courts.
Indeed, across all three outcome variables, there is no statistically
significant multiplicative interaction between any of the support
conditions and:
• The timing of the support
• Perceived politicization
• Respondents’ beliefs that “a good state supreme court justice”
should “air television advertisements during their campaigns to
inform the public about their views”
• Respondents’ beliefs that “a good state supreme court justice”
should “refuse to accept any campaign contributions from
anyone”
• Respondents’ beliefs that “a good state supreme court justice”
should “publicly condemn television advertisements made by
groups who do not disclose their donors”
There is no evidence that the effect of any of the types of campaign
support on any of the outcome variables—fairness, vote intention, or
legitimacy—is different based on respondents’ normative or
retrospective views of their state supreme court.  In other words, the
effects are the same among those who tolerate campaign contributions
and those who dislike them; among those who believe judges should
condemn dark money groups and those who support such groups; and
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among those who believe judges act like legislators and those who
view judges as divorced from politics.
VI. CONCLUSION
The overriding conclusion of this study is that voters penalize courts
and judges less for support by dark money groups than for direct or
independent support by litigants.  On the one hand, this result seems
surprising: we might expect voters to be more likely to penalize judges
for failing to denounce such contributions, doing their best to rely in-
stead on the support of contributors whose identities are known.  At
the same time, perhaps the result for dark money is a rational re-
sponse to not knowing whether the litigant donated.  This issue high-
lights the key problem with dark money contributions: from the text
of the vignette, respondents do not know whether the litigant was in-
volved in the dark money contribution, so they “punish” the court less
than if the contribution was obvious.  The issue with dark money is
that there is no way for them to find out and therefore to appropri-
ately sanction the court for the contribution if such a penalty is
warranted.
The same is true in the real world: litigants do not know whether the
opposing litigant donated money to the judge and there is no way for
them to find out.  This lack of available information has important
downstream consequences: the media is unable to report on potential
conflicts of interest, litigants are unable to support motions for recusal
when they are deemed necessary, and the public generally has no op-
portunity to judge the potential ethical violations of their judges.
At the same time, this “out of sight, out of mind” finding also points
to a practical difficulty with campaign finance reform efforts.  If citi-
zens do not see the conflict of interest, they are unlikely to see the
problem.  Such conflicts of interest are relatively difficult issues for
most people to understand.  This, coupled with the fact that people
generally pay little attention to politics at the state level, suggests that
reformers face an uphill battle as they seek to remedy the deleterious
effects of dark money contributions.
There are three major weaknesses of the survey.  First, and most
obviously, the data upon which the analysis relies comes from a con-
venience sample of Amazon Mechanical Turk workers.  Though I
have presented evidence that the sample’s composition is not unique,
such convenience samples are not ideal.  Second, the vignette simply
informed respondents that ads were aired, without any flavor for the
tone or content of the ads.  As Gibson and his colleagues have shown,
the content of television advertisements can have significant effects on
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support for courts.78  Accordingly, it might be that if dark money
groups aired particular types of negative advertisements while candi-
dates aired positive advertisements, citizens would judge the effect of
these types of campaign support differently.  Finally, and most impor-
tantly, all of the effects discussed in the experiment are conditional on
the judge receiving support.  Gibson and Caldeira showed that a re-
fusal to accept campaign support can nullify the deleterious conse-
quences of receiving that support; as a result, it is important to
remember that these findings lack a true baseline condition of no
support.
Overall, these results suggest that we need to expand our under-
standing of how citizens judge conflicts of interest, both to understand
their effect on courts but also to understand how to best mobilize the
public around reform efforts.  After all, recusal is often motivated by
“appearance[s] of impropriety,” but we know little about what ap-
pears improper to the public.  Indeed, given survey results that
demonstrate the public has widely different understandings and ex-
pectations of law and courts,79 it may well be that what reformers be-
lieve is improper differs markedly from what appears improper to the
public.
The other major implication of this study80 concerns the relation-
ship between perceived politicization and campaign activity.  There is
a burgeoning political science literature that suggests that perceived
politicization is particularly harmful for courts,81 and that politiciza-
tion affects how individuals learn about and accept judicial deci-
sions.82  This is a large contradiction: perceived politicization is
harmful for courts, but many of the trappings of politicized cam-
paigns—like policy talk, television advertisements, and dark money
support—appear to minimally affect citizens’ support for courts.  How
can this be?  Future research should endeavor to answer this question.
78. Gibson et al., supra note 1, at 9–10.
79. Gibson, supra note 3, at 34.
80. For more on the normative implications of empirical legal studies, see Brandon L. Bartels
& Chris W. Bonneau, MAKING LAW AND COURTS RESEARCH RELEVANT: THE NORMATIVE IM-
PLICATIONS OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH (2014).
81. Gibson & Nelson, supra note 23, at 25; JAMES L. GIBSON & GREGORY A. CALDEIRA,
CITIZENS, COURTS, AND CONFIRMATIONS 4 (2009).
82. Benjamin Woodson, Politicization and the Two Modes of Evaluating Judicial Decisions, 3
J. LAW & COURTS 193, 195 (2015).
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